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The proliferation of government-sponsored enterprises, or GSEs, has forever
shaped the way in which the federal government of the United States ensures the
provision of public goods and services. GSEs represent a hybrid or quasigovemm~ntal organization that is specific to the United States. In addition, GSEs are
created by congressional or executive action but are privately-owned organizations
that are charged with achieving a public goal while also seeking to earn a profit for its
shareholders. GSEs function primarily as financial intermediaries that extend credit to
underserved Americans in various types of markets.
GSEs occupy a contentious position in the field of public administration;
many critics attack the government's preference for GSEs as a threat to federalism,
democracy, and government accountability. These critics ofGSEs attack the
intrusion of private sector behavior and management styles into the public sector.
The private sector style of management is represented by the Entrepreneurial
Management Paradigm while the pubic sector style of management is represented by
the Constitutionalist Management Paradigm. In this thesis, two GSEs--Fannie Mae

and Freddie Mac-are utilized as framing this debate over GSEs. Moreover, the
author identifies the legislation that led to the creation of GS Es and how current
public law and Constitutional law affect the perception of GS Es.
In addition, the debate over GSEs has been with more cries of accountability
at the governmental level. Looking critically at these issues, the author argues that
there is no clear consensus of the meaning of the word accountability when it is
applied to GSEs. Furthermore, politicians and public managers too often conflate
controllability as meaning accountability.
Ultimately, it is concluded that GSEs are not likely to vanish from the federal
government. On the contrary, in order to protect the division of powers, democracy,
and ensure accountability, academics and administrators must reassess the term
accountability and ensure ways to hold these hybrid organizations accountable. In the
end, it is concluded that GSEs are neither a purely positive or negative aspect of
modem federal government; rather they are integral parts of modern public
administration that demand public administrators to reassess the meanings of
accountability.
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Introduction
Government-sponsored enterprises, or GSEs, have forever shaped the way in
which the federal government ensures the provision of public goods and services.
Created over seventy years ago, these types of organizations have blossomed into
major institutional actors at the federal level. Ranging from the provision of student
loans for college to assisting new homeowners in acquiring a mortgage, the range of
GSE activity can be felt in numerous aspects of society. While these organizations
serve as a popular avenue for public good provision, the lasting influence of the
federal government's reliance on these types of organizations has not received much
attention outside the realm of academia. Nevertheless, the increasing reliance on
GSEs has raised the attention of many critics who argue that the prevalence of such
organizations represents a credible threat to federalism, popular sovereignty, and
governmental accountability.
By using arguably the most recognizable GSEs as a case study, Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac, this thesis analyzes the impact that GSEs have had on the federal
government, its operations, and the accountability of its programs. In addition, this
thesis investigates the effects of the private sector management practices being
applied to the public sector. Moreover, this thesis argues that the term
"accountability" possesses multiple facets more than simply controllability. In the
end, it is concluded that GSEs are neither a purely positive or negative aspect of
modem federal government; rather they are integral parts of modem public
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administration that demand public administrators to reassess the meanings of
accountability.

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: A Case Study

For many Americans, becoming a homeowner is part of the so-called
"American Dream." Once an individual becomes a homeowner, this action takes on
significant symbolic meaning for the individual and his or her family. The act of
becoming a homeowner exists as a symbolic, ritualistic rite of passage into becoming
an established member of a given community. For the children and grandchildren of
recent immigrants, whose parents may have been forced to find shelter in crowded,
decrepit ghettos with absentee landlords, the opportunity to purchase a home is a
monumental occasion. Such an act is a chance for an individual to confront the
discrimination that their parents and grandparents suffered under and to silence the
power that these modes of discrimination once possessed.
Besides representing a symbolic passage, homeownership is vital to
communities everywhere for numerous reasons. First of all, the property taxes that
homeowners pay to the city, county, state, and federal governments contribute to
funding essential programs, especially public schools. As a corollary, it is no
coincidence that many of the top-performing, fiscally healthy public schools are those
schools that are located in or near areas where there is a high density of homeowners
with significant property values. Secondly, studies have indicated that crime rates are
substantially lower in areas designated with a high density of homeowners versus a
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community with a low density of homeowners. Homeownership also is an essential'
factor in building community capacity and encouraging an active citizenry.
Recognizing the magnitude of the impact that homeownership has on the
micro level of the individual and the macro level of the health of a community and
region, various levels of government have made homeownership a primary target to
achieve. The Community Reinvestme_nt Act of 1978 (CRA) forbade the practice of
"redlining," in which banks would refuse to provide loans to individuals and families
who resided in certain areas that were designated on a map as supposedly highdefault risk areas. 1 Moreover, the federal government provides numerous tax credits
and incentives to first-time homebuyers to assist in the cost of purchasing a home.
For example, this year alone, first-time homebuyers are eligible for an $8,000 tax
credit that does not have to be repaid over the life of the mortgage. In addition to the
prohibition of discriminatory lending practices and establishment of tax credits and
incentives for first-time homebuyers, the federal government has created numerous
organizations to provide citizens direct assistance in their quest to become a
homeowner. Of these organizations, two provide the most direct mortgage assistance
to potential homeowners: the Federal National Mortgage Association (better known
as Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Corporation (better known as Freddie
Mac). 2

1

Gary Paul Green and Anna Haines, Asset Building & Community Development, 2"' edition, (Los
Angeles: Sage, 2008), 152
2
Jonathan Kopp ell, The Politics of Quasi-Government (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2003), 187.
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These mortgage loan giants known as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac represent
two of the nation's most prominent hybrid organizations. These organizations "are
private, profit-seeking corporations created by Congress to serve a public purpose:
increasing availability
.,, of credit to American home buyers while bringing stability and
liquidity to the financial sector." 3 The storied past of these two hybrid organizations
reveals insight into the current-day dispute over the function and regulation of these
organizations. This section will cast the current-day dispute over the proper reach of
these two organizations onto a historical backdrop and identify key developments in
the evolution of these organizations that have led the controversy over what their
proper roles should be.
The history of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac can be traced back to the
Depression era, when the federal government decided to create a secondary market
for mortgages in 1938. The federal government created this secondary market so that
banks could sell mortgages to "maintain their cash flow and allow the housing
industry to stay afloat. " 4 Prior to this creation, the federal government had passed the
National Housing Act of 1934 and created the Federal Housing Administration as a
means to "insure lenders against borrower default." 5 In order to lift the United States
out of the Depression, Congress enacted the legislation in an effort to stimulate the

3

Koppell, 187.
Debbie Kwiatoski and Dylan Skriloff, "Fannie and Freddie ... and You," Hudson Valley Business
Journal, September 15, 2008, 23 -27, available from <http://wwws.moreheadst.edu:2048/login?url-http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=f5h&AN=34704808&si
te=ehost-live>; accessed 16 February 2009.
5
Koppell, 189.
4
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housing market by spurring home sales and the construction of new homes, thereby
causing a chain reaction in the economy. 6
Although Congress had planned for the National Housing Act of 1934 to bring
the economy out of Depression, the short term recovery growth failed to take hold.

'.

As Jonathan Koppell notes, "Private mortgage associations were expected to purchase
the mortgages from the lenders and hold them as investments. Such associations
never materialized." 7 (Koppell 189-90). As a result, in 1938, Congress created an
office within the Reconstruction Finance Corporation with the sole purpose of
purchasing these insured mortgages. Kopp ell notes the immediate impact of the
creation of this office on the market for available mortgages:
This office, eventually named the Federal National Mortgage
Association (FNMA), purchased FHA-insured loans from private
lenders. The federal government thus created a secondary mortgage
market-a place for lenders to sell loans-thereby increasing the
supply of money for yet more loans ... 8
The FNMA, or Fannie Mae as it is more commonly known, provided the
psychological reassurance that lenders needed to offer more loans to potential
borrowers. Since the federal government had created this secondary market, lenders
could offer loans to Fannie Mae and then allow Fannie Mae to offer these same loans
to borrowers, creating a buffer of insurance against potentially cataclysmic defaults
industry-wide.

6

Koppel!, 189.
'Koppel!, 189-90.
8
Koppel!. 189 - 90.
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Fannie Mae remained owned and operated by the federal government until
1968 when it became a government-sponsored by enterprise, or GSE. 9 Many factors
contributed to Fannie Mae emerging as a quasi-public entity. One of the main
reasons was the pressure of restraining a ballooning federal budget. Musolf and
Seidman note:
Wanting to avoid the "vagaries of the total budget situation," President
Johnson's Secretary of Housing and Urban Development urged that
the Federal National Mortgage Association be converted form a
mixed-ownership government corporation to a government-sponsored
private enterprise. He argued that "By putting the secondary market
operations outside of the Government, and thereby, outside of the
budget, it would be possible for Fannie Mae to be more responsive to
the needs, we believe, of the building and mortgage financing industry
that it can be now." 10
As a result, the federal government sold off all ownership of Fannie Mae to private
owners and chartered it as a "fully private government-sponsored enterprise (Moe
1983)." 11 Since 1968, Fannie Mae has existed and operated in the mortgage market
as a government-sponsored enterprise.
In addition to this government-sponsored enterprise, Fannie Mae's "much
younger sibling," Freddie Mac, was created by Congress in 1970 to help serve the
mortgage industry as well. 12 Specifically, Congress chartered the Federal Home
Loan Mortgage Corporation as means "to purchase loans made by institutions that
were part of the Federal Home Loan Bank System. Similar to the fate of its sister
9

Kwiatoski and Skriloff, 23.
Lloyd D. Musolf and Harold Seidman, "The Blurred Boundaries of Public Administration," Public
Administration Review 40, no. 2 (March -April I 980): 127 0oumal online]; available from
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/975622>; accessed 2 February 2009.
11
Koppell, 189 - 90.
12
Koppell, 47.
10
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organization, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac was transformed into a private ownership
GSE in 1989 following the savings and loan (S&L) crisis. 13

How do Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Function as GSEs?

As stated previously, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac operate as GSEs that
create a secondary mortgage market in an effort to assist potential homeowners in
acquiring loans. Since 1968, the mission of these GSEs has changed and they are
"now charged by Congress and the President with extending credit opportunities to
underserved communities while continuing to facilitate home purchases by middleclass Americans." 14 In an effort to achieve these two goals, Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac operate in the following manner:
GSEs, like Fannie and Freddie, operate by borrowing money (in the
form of these securities they sell) at rates that are someplace inbetween what the US Treasury offers and what the private markets
offer - typically anywhere from 25 - 50 basis points (or ¼ to ½
percent) lower than a private market would be able to offer. These
lowered rates are partially passed on to homeowners in the form of a
break on their mortgage rate. 15
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac serve as intermediaries between the borrower and
lender by establishing a secondary market for mortgages. Without the presence of
GSEs like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, a first-time home buyer with a low or nonexistent credit score may not be able to secure a loan directly from a private lender
due to the fear of the lender that this individual, who possesses little or no credit

13
14

15

Koppell, 189 - 90.
Koppell, 47.
Kwiatoski and Skriloff, 23.
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rating, may not be able to make his or her monthly mortgage payments and may
eventually default on the loan payments. In addition, if this individual were actually
to receive a mortgage loan from a lender, the interest rate at which the individual
receives the loan would be higher to reflect the lender's concern over the default risk.
With the entrance of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into the mortgage market, these
GSEs buy loans from private lenders and pool these investments into a portfolio.
Moreover, the two GSEs also combine these mortgages and create mortgage-backed
securities which they sell in tum to private investors. 16 As a result of pooling their
investments together, these hybrid organizations spread out the default risk and are
able to provide mortgages to individuals at a lower rate than otherwise possible.
Since Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac purchase these mortgage investments
from private lenders then tum around and offer homebuyers these loans at lower
rates, the federal government in effect is expressing an implicit guarantee that it will
cover any bad debts incurred by the sale of mortgages to individuals who default on
their loans. In other words, this implicit guarantee is the "idea that the U.S. Treasury
would backstop these agencies in the event of a real financial collapse." This implicit
guarantee explains some of the major reasons why foreign investors and foreign
countries such as China, Japan, and Russia have purchased these mortgage-backed
securities. Due in large part to the implicit backing of their debts by the federal
government, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mao currently "underwrite nearly half of all

16

Koppel!, 29.

14

mortgages" and possess approximately $5.2 trillion worth ofmortgages. 17 Their
prominence in the mortgage industry led to a combined net income for the two GSEs
in 2001 of greater than $10 billion. Out of the "Fortune 500" companies in 2002,
Fannie Mae rankec\,. second in total assets and Freddie Mac placed at sixth in total
assets. 18

Two Basic Regulations of-Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
Due to their unique status as GSEs, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac enjoy
several benefits of being a congressionally-chartered, privately-owned corporation.
As with other GSEs, one of the major benefits of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is that
these hybrid organizations are not subject to the same laws and regulations of other
governmental agencies. Because GSEs are instrumentalities of the federal
government and not federal agencies by definition, they are not subject to the same
restraints as agencies as defined by U.S. Code. 19 Furthermore, Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac are "exempt from state and local taxes, exempt from the registration
requirements of the Securities and Exchange Commission, and have a $2.25 billion
line of credit with the United States Treasury." 20 Another benefit is that due to the
implicit backing by the federal government, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac pay rates
on borrowed money that are close to the level that the federal government itself pays

17

K wiatoski and Skriloff, 23.
Koppell, 188.
19
Ronald C. Moe, "The Emerging Federal Quasi Government: Issues of Management and
Accountability," Public Administration Review 61, no. 3 (May - June 2001 ): 295 Oournal online];
available from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/977601>; accessed 2 February 2009.
20
Koppell, 187.
18
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to borrow money. 21 Existing as a privately-owned company that enjoys implicit
backing by the federal government,
... Fannie and Freddie have all the advantages possessed by our
fictitious entities and none of the disadvantages. It is not surprising
that Fannie and Freddie generally resisted calls for their complete
"privatization," severing the remaining ties to the federal
government. 22
As GSEs, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are privately-owned and profit
seeking organizations that are subject to only two main governmental regulations.
One of the regulations ensures that the two GS Es are operating "in a fiscally prudent
manner" to prevent the scenario of an actual "bail out" by the federal government.
Second, these GSEs, while they are privately-owned entities that seek to provide its
shareholders a return on their investments; thyy still must adhere to the original
purpose charged to them by Congress and the President. 23

The 1992 FHEFSSA Law
In 1992, Congress passed the Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety
and Soundness Act (FHEFSSA) in response to the criticism for more regulation of
GSEs following the wake up of the S&L crisis in 1989. 24 In light of the fallout from
the S&L bailout, attention was brought to Congress about the substantial fiscal
liability that off-budget GSEs pose to the U.S. Treasury. As a result, legislation was
included in the 1989 S&L bailout law that called for "a study of the government's
21
22

23

24

Koppell, 29.
Koppell, 103.
Koppell, 29 - 30.
Koppell, 47.
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GSE liability." These subsequent reports eventually led to the passing of the
FHEFSSA in 1992.

25

This legislation separated regulatory authority over Fannie

Mae and Freddie Mac into two different organizations: the Department of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD) and the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise
Oversight (OFHEO). For HUD, this organization would have oversight over
"programmatic regulations" of the two GSEs; i.e., HUD ensures that Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac adhere to their public purposes of extending credit to underserved
communities and selling mortgages. The OFHEO is "responsible for safety and
soundness regulation;" the OFHEO provides monitoring of capital reserves and
ensures that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are not exposed to extreme financial risk. 26
Specifically, the 1992 FHEFSSA mandated two separate capital regulations
that OFHEO enforced. The first of the regulations is the minimum capital
requirement, which is percentage of capital as a certain proportion of their liabilities
that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac must have on reserve. Secondly, the 1992
legislation created a "risk-based capital requirement," which is a fluid amount of
reserves that the GSEs must have on hand. The amount is flexible and based upon a
"computerization" model which is used to "simulate the effects of massive downturns
in the economy on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac." This risk-based amount changes
depending on the debt obligations of each organization in every quarter. 27 As of
2008, the OFHEO was dismantled and its regulatory duties reassigned per the
25
26
27

Koppel!, I 07.
Koppel!, 47.
Koppel!, 49.
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legislation within the 2008 Housing Recovery Act. 28 This legislation will be
addressed later in the thesis.

A Conflict Among GSE Purposes?

As previously alluded to, GSEs have three objectives. The first objective is
"to fulfill programmatic policy purposes." The second purpose ofGSEs is "to
maintain a financially safe and sound operation that minimizes risk to the federal
government." Thirdly, GSEs are "to operate as a profitable private company that
maintains consistent return to shareholders." In his text The Politics ofQuasi-

Government, Koppell notes that "each objective is potentially in conflict with the
other two. " 29 Figure 1 below represents the "triangular model of interests" as it
appears in Koppell' s text.
Figure 1: Triangular Model of Interests / Conflict. 30

Profitability

Programmatic
objectives
(housing)

Financial
safety and
soundness

As illustrated in the figure above, the obtainment of one of the objectives may
preclude the two other objectives from being met. For example, as GSEs, Fannie
28

United States Government Printing Office, Housing and Economic Recovery Act o/2008
(Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2008), 141.
29
Koppell, I 04.
30
Koppell, I 04.
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Mae and Freddie Mac are privately-owned corporations, in which the management of
both hybrid organizations is charged with making wise investments that yield a return
for the shareholders of both GSEs. Although profit seeking is a viable and
appropriate goal fo; GS Es, the management of these organizations cannot seek
profitability at all costs. Depending on the conditions of the economy, an investment
that yields high returns in the short run may reverse its course and hand down heavy
losses that endanger the financial safety and soundness of the organization.
Moreover, while offering mortgages in primarily popular, high-demand locations may
generate a higher return for a particular GSE, concentrating mortgages in such areas
prohibits the organizations from extending much needed loans to underserved
communities.
While GSEs such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac enjoy distinct benefits from
their classification as GSEs, this very classification creates the potential for
conflicting organizational objectives. Such organizations demand effective
managerial leadership that understands the opposing pull of private sector objectives
and governmental mandates. Furthermore, effective leadership of GSEs demands that
public administrators and managers of quasi-governmental organizations reassess
what the term accountability entails when it is applied to the world of GSEs.

Privatizing Profit and Socializing Risk?
GSEs, especially Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, have come under intense
scrutiny for their potential financial risk to the U.S. Treasury. Many critics ofGSEs

19

argue that organizations such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac enjoy a unique status
that allows them to privatize their profit but socialize their risk.

31

In other words,

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have the opportunity to enjoy profitable returns on their
investments, but th~ implicit backing by the federal government changes the manner
in which these GSEs behave in the marketplace. Critics add that this implicit backing
entices GSEs to partake in riskier investments than they would otherwise without the
backing of the federal government. Although certainly not a desirable position to find
themselves, in theory Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac could fall back on the federal
government to fulfill their debt obligations if they no longer existed as solvent
corporations.
The subprime mortgage crisis of 2008 intensified the debate over the proper
role of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the mortgage securities industry. Previous to
2008, more and more private mortgage companies had entered the booming industry
since 200 I. 32 The entrance of these private mortgage companies, along with the
presence of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, forever changed the mortgage industry
within the U.S. The drive of private mortgage companies to earn a profit coupled
with objective of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to increase homeownership across the
nation created a "perfect storm" that eventually sent the mortgage industry into a
violent tailspin. Prior to the explosion of private mortgage companies into the

31

Moe, Emerging Federal, 295.
Roger Lowenstein, ''No Free Bubble," NY Times, 27 July 2008, MM! 3; available from
<http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/27/magazine/27wwln-ledet.html? r=l&scp=J&sq=lowenstein%20free%20bubble&st=cse>; accessed 16 February 2009.

32
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market, banks controlled most of mortgage lending. As a result, banks relied upon
four criteria for determining mortgage loans: "(!) how much income you had
(documented); (2) what your down payment was; (3) your credit history; and (4) the
assessed value of the home." 33 Kwiatoski and Skriloff(2008) write that:
Banks - who used to do all the lending before mortgage brokers came
on the scene - could 'dial up or dial down' any particular category to
see if they felt comfortable giving a home loan .... The rise of the
private mortgage industry and all sorts of new products - that were
sliced and diced and monetarized into investment offerings - gave rise
to the subprime loan, which was largely based upon just one thing;
your credit score. 34
With the explosion of available mortgages, private mortgage companies began
to offer increasing amounts of mortgages to individuals based mostly upon their
credit score-while turning a blind eye to insufficient incomes. Critics claim that this
phenomenon combined with the mission of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to promote
homeownership overextended the housing market; in short, the push by private
investors and policy makers to "encourage more housing than markets will support"
resulted in "mortgages that [failed]." 35 In addition, other critics indicate that
reactionary policy to the initial subprime fallout exacerbated the crisis. At a time
when Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac ought to have been reassessing their financial
solvency, the U.S. government encouraged even more mortgages, further
complicating the mortgage crisis. 36

33

Kwiatoski and Skriloff, 25.
Kwiatoski and Skriloff, 25.
35
Lowenstein, MM 13.
36
Lowenstein, MM 13.
34

21

Critics for GSE reform have been clamoring in Washington for over twenty
years, arguing among other points that the exceptional status of GSEs like Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac expose the nation to extreme financial liability in the event of a
severe economic dpwnturn. Some of the detractors included members of former
,•

President Reagan's administration, who staunchly believed that federal support of
GSEs distorts market conditions. While some activists in the Reagan administration
may have sought to abolish Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac entirely, such an action
never came into fruition. 37 Since the objective of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is to
promote homeownership, the prevalence of their objectives in the public mindset of
Americans allows these GSEs to "wrap themselves in the flag;" i.e., any attacks on
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac can be "politically costly." 38 As mentioned previously,
the status that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac enjoy as GSEs allow them to lobby
Congress and construct a significant network of relations between influential
politicians and other interest groups. 39 Still, the concern over exposing the taxpayers
to substantial financial loss at the hands of Fannie Mae and Freddie M!)c and the
mortgage crisi_s led to the passage of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of
2008. This act changed the regulatory structure of both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
considerably.

37

Ronald C. Moe and Thomas H. Stanton, "Government-sponsored Enterprises as Federal
Instrumentalities: Reconciling Private Management with Public Accountability," Public
Administration Review 49, no. 4 (July-August 1989): 322 [journal online]; available from
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/97684 l>; accessed 2 February 2009.
38
Koppell, 10 I.
39
Koppell, 89 - 90.
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The Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008
Signed into law by former President Bush on July 30, 2008, the Housing and
Economic Recovery Act brought with it drastic changes to the function of the Federal
Housing Administration (FHA), as well the function and regulatory structure of the

•

GSEs Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. While the legislation is expansive, this thesis
will focus on the portion of legislation that deals with the function and regulatory
structure of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
In 1992, Congress passed the Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety
and Soundness Act (FHEFSSA) that created the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise
Oversight (OFHEO) as a regulatory agency within the Department of Housing and
Urban Development. Prior to the passage of the Housing and Economic Recovery
Act (further denoted as the Reform Act), OFHEO was charged with the task of
ensuring that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac adhered to specific capital reserve
mandates as well as risk-based capital requirements that varied depending upon the
prevailing market conditions. The Federal Housing Finance Regulatory Reform Act
of2008 drastically changed the regulatory structure of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
by completely dismantling the OFHEO. The reform act replaced the OFHEO with
the Federal Housing Finance Agency who is led by a single Director. The legislation
granted the Director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) authority over
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLBs). The FHFA

23

was created as an independent agency of the federal government. 40 The Director of
the FHFA is appointed by the President with the consent of the Senate and serves a
term of five years. In addition, the legislation separates the duties of the agency to
Deputy Directors in charge of the Division of Enterprise Regulation and Housing
Mission and Goals. 41 Some critics contend that the new regulatory agency
overseeing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac will impose higher capital requirements and
increase the risk-based capital assessment level for these GSEs. 42
In addition to creating a separate agency to regulate the actions of Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac, the Reform Act also created within FHFA an Office of Inspector
General and an Office of the Ombudsman. As stated within the legislation, the Office
of the Ombudsman will be "responsible for considering complaints and
appeals ... regarding any matter relating to the regulation and supervision of such
regulated entity by the Agency. " 43
One of the most controversial features of the Reform Act is Section 1117,
which authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury the temporary authority "to purchase
any obligations and other securities" of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. 44 Numerous
critics of GSEs cite this action as nothing more than a bailout of private parties via the
taxpayers' money. On the other hand, others have noted that this provision in Section
40

Housing Act, 8.
Housing Act, 9.
42
Jim DeMasi, "GSE Refonn Legislation: Implications for the Investment Portfolio," Community
Banker 17, no. 9, (September 2008): 51 [journal online]; available from <http://wwws.moreheadst.edu:204Bnogin?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direcFtrue&db=f5h&AN=343l2686&si
te=ehost-live>; accessed 5 April 2009.
43
Housing Act, 14.
44
Housing Act, 30.
41
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1117 of the Reform Act is nothing more than an explicit reassurance of the federal
government's implicit guarantee to serve as financial lifeline for Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac in an effort to sustain a failing mortgage industry by providing the
necessary capital for lenders and borrowers. 45 This temporary authorization of the
Secretary of the Treasury lasts until the end of 2009, and in order for the Secretary to
purchase this debt, the Secretary "must make an emergency determination that the
action is necessary to stabilize markets, prevent disruptions in mortgage availability,
and protect the taxpayer. " 46
Section 1125 of the Reform Act mandate~ that the Director of the FHFA meet
with Congress on an annual basis to discuss the housing and the mortgage industry, as
well as requiring the Director to conduct monthly surveys of mortgages markets. 47
The legislation also amends the Federal National Mortgage Association Charter Act
and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation Act to set forth increased loan
limitations for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. 48 Moreover, the Reform Act also
requires Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to register their securities with Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC). 49 Prior to passage of the Housing and Economic
Recovery Act, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were not legally obligated to register
their securities with the SEC since they are GSEs. The Recovery Act amended the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to include Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the
45
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Federal Home Loan Banks under these new registration requirements. 50 This section
of the Recovery Act legislation removes a portion of the benefits that Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac once enjoyed due to their status as GSEs.
In general, the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of2008 introduced
sweeping changes into the administrative structure and regulatory structure of Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac. In response to the collapse of the mortgage crisis, lawmakers
sought ways to reign in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and stave off further
foreclosures. Senate Banking Committee Chairman Christopher Dodd (DConnecticut) stated, "By ... reforming the GSEs so they are better able to fulfill their
mission of providing affordable housing options, this bill addresses the root of our
current economic problems-the foreclosure crisis-and takes a step in the right
direction toward getting our economy back on track." MBA Chairman P. Quinn
adds:
The GSEs need strong regulatory oversight to ensure they operate in a
safe and sound manner, consistent with their charters. Further, we
believe the GSEs ought to be subject to reasonable affordable-housing
goals that do not distort the market .... The proposal to allow FHA to
assist troubled borrowers has the potential to help stabilize markets
and avoid foreclosures. We want to ensure there are appropriate
safeguards to help deserving borrowers while keeping the program
voluntary for lenders. 51
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The Recovery Act represents a significant step towards ensuring more accountability
from GSEs like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Lawmakers recognized the criticisms
of the lack of accountability of GSEs and the fact that the FHEFSSA of 1992 simply
did not provide s!ri_c::t enough guidelines for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to operate
in manner that was both profitable and prudent in the long run. The dismantling of
the OFHEO and the subsequent creation of the FHFA created a more direct line of
managerial accountability from the President to the actions of Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac in the mortgage industry. The Recovery Act does not shoestring these
GSEs from pursuing rational investment opportunities that will yield a profit to their
shareholders. Nor does this legislation explicitly guarantee that the federal
government will backstop these GSEs in the event of an economic collapse of the
mortgage industry. 52 On the contrary, the Recovery Act increases the programmatic
accountability of the public functions of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The monthly
surveys, annual congressional meetings, and the new SEC requirements should help
ensure that these GSEs will pursue investments that are not only profitable but also
provide stability in the housing sector. In addition, the increase in the capital reserve
requirements as well the risk-based capital requirements will help prevent the
mortgage market from becoming overly saturated.
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Hybrid Organizations and GSEs - History, Form, Function, & Criticism

Governments provide goods and services for the taxpayers who fund them.
These goods and services range from defense from foreign nations to reduced school
lunches to providing
safe drinking water to providing funding assistance for higher
I
education. Throughout the history of the United States, each level of federal, state,
and local governments have delivered such public goods and services through various
means. For many services, the government itself provides the service directly to its
constituency through its many agencies. Alternatively, the last eighty years have
witnessed an unprecedented proliferation of nonprofit and private companies
involved what were once solely government actions. The intertwining of the global
economies has accelerated this proliferation as well as attempts by several presidents
at "New Federalism:"
Contracting for government services has become increasingly popular
in the U.S., both across the levels of government and policy arenas.
Recent "devolution" of selected program responsibilities from the
federal to state overnments has accelerated this trend - especially for
social service. 5

f

What was once the sole domain for the government is now witnessing the inclusion of
nonprofits, private business, and hybrid organizations known as governmentsponsored enterprises, or GSEs. Specifically, within in the U.S., the federal
government has been relying upon some forms of GSEs to provide goods and
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services to the public since the Great Depression. 54 GS Es represent a unique
combination of public and private interests that are created to provide stability to a
given market. The following section is an analysis of the American GSEs in their
role of providing services to the public and how their creation has permanently
altered governmental and organizational accountability.
Public administrators trace the origins of GSEs back to several enterprises that
were created as a result of the Great Depression in the 193 Os. 55 In an effort to correct
the market failures and resuscitate the economy, President Roosevelt and Congress
created numerous enterprises that later became known as an "alphabet soup of
entities." Some of these enterprises included the Export-Import Bank (Exim), the
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), and the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation.
Many of these agencies and enterprises still function today but have undergone
significant changes in their regulatory structure. While these organizations were
originally chartered as government agencies or enterprises, many were eventually
"sold to private entities" entirely or "hybridized." 56 As mentioned within this thesis,
one of these entities that was created during the Depression era was the Federal
National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), which became a full-fledged hybrid
GSE in 1968. 57
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government's reliance on the utilization of hybrids for financing mortgages to
maintaining public transit networks, "the combined liability of federal
hybrids ... exceeds $2 trillion. " 61 Simply stated by Moe (200 I), "There is nothing
modest about the size, scope, and impact of the quasi-government." 62
From this definition of a hybrid organization, one can narrow the definition of
a GSE. Moe and Stanton (1989) describe a GSE as "a privately owned, federally
chartered financial institution with nationwide scope and limited lending power that
benefits from an implicit federal guarantee to enhance its ability to borrow money." 63
Moe (200 I) adds to this definition, writing "Congress created GS Es to help make
credit more readily available to sectors of the economy believed to be disadvantaged
in the credit markets (Stanton, 1991, 2001)." 64 In the case of Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac, these GSEs help Americans gain access to the mortgage market and ultimately
purchase a home. Specifically, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mae "issue capital stock and
short- and long-term debt instruments, guarantee-mortgage backed securities," and
"purchase loans and hold them in their own portfolios." 65
While it is necessary to understand what GSEs are, it is as vital, if not more
vital, to understand what GSEs are not. By definition, GSEs are instrumentalities of
the government and are not agencies. 66 Moe (2001) notes:
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GS Es are instrumentalities, not agencies, of the United States - a
legally and administratively important distinction .... An agency (as
defined in Title 5) is managed directly through the federal
management hierarchy. It is subject to all general management laws
and regulations provided in the U.S. Code .... An instrumentality of
government, on the other hand, is a privately owned institution that is
not subject to any of the general management laws and regulations
unless so indicated in its enabling legislation (charter). 67
Title 5 of the U.S. Code defines what constitutes an agency and the subsequent rules
and regulations to which they must adhere. 68 On the contrary, the definition of

instrumentalities in the context of GSEs lacks any basis in federal statute. Moe and
Stanton (1989) clarify that "an instrumentality is a privately-owned institution that
may be supervised but is not directly managed by the federal government. The
federal government uses an instrumentality to carry out government purposes in
addition to usual private purposes such as profit making for its owners." 69
Since GSEs are not agencies according to U.S. Code, they provide an
alternative for the government to execute certain projects and programs that may not
have otherwise been feasible. The devolution of formerly federal programs to state
governments has "accelerated this trend" of utilizing GS Es. 70 Due in large part to
this devolution, GSEs serve as a viable option for government for three main reasons.
First, proponents of GSEs argue that these organizations "promise greater
effectiveness than traditional governmental agencies at a lower cost to taxpayers."
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Secondly, GSEs serve as a more "businesslike" alternative to traditional agencies. 71
The drive to make government more efficient gained momentum in the 1990's with
the National Performance Review and its calls for business sector concepts to be
applied to the governmental sector. 72 Since GSEs are instrumentalities and are
flexible organization, one writer notes:
[ ... ] the quasi-markets of the "reinvented" public sector constitute a
realm of efficient and responsible service for consumers, while
orthodox public service delivery systems (especially local
government) are dominated by political bias and manipulation. Public
services ... "can be made responsive [only] by giving the public
choices, or by instituting mechanisms which build in publiclyapproved standards and redress when they are not attained." 73
This type of business-centric management of public programs will be addressed later
in the thesis. Thirdly, these organizations are exempt from Security and Exchange
Commission (SEC) regulation and state/local income taxes." Lastly, the implicit
backing by the federal government attracts more reliance upon GSEs; "on average,
the combined size of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac has more than doubled every five
years since 1968."

74

GSEs serve as an alternative to traditional government

programs. By emphasizing "structural disaggregation" and the "creation of 'task
specific' organizations; "performance contracting;" and "deregulation," various levels
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of government are utilizing GSEs to achieve such goals. 75 Moe (200 I) identified four
major reasons that have led to the proliferation of GSEs:
I. Current controls on the federal budget process that encourage
agencies to develop new sources of revenues;
2. Desire by advocates of agencies and programs to be exempt from
central management laws, especially statutory ceilings on personnel
and compensation;
3. Contemporary appeal of generic, business-focused values as the
basis for a New Public Management; and
4. Belief that management flexibility requires entity-specific laws and
regulations, even at the cost of less accountability to representative
institutions. 76
As a corollary of reducing the size of the budget, some GS Es offer types of
subsidies, which under a traditional federal program, would be included in a given
budget. In the example of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, these "subsidies supposedly
generate from the implicit federal backing by the federal government and are passed
through to consumers "in the form oflower mortgages rates." 77
Though the size and scope of GSEs has increased over the last thirty years, a
tenuous relationship has manifested itself between proponents of GS Es and their
critics. It is common knowledge that the U.S. has been relying upon GSEs for the
provision of public goods and services at an ever-increasing rate for the last three
decades. Nevertheless, critics cite that this growing reliance on GSEs as a
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programmatic crutch has weakened the entirety of public administration. Koppell
(2003) summarizes this concern of too much reliance on GSEs:
... Critics of quasi-government claim that hybrids are simply beyond
the control of elected officials, and, by extension, the public. In the
rush to move government expenditures off-budget and bring 'market
efficiency' into the public sector, policy responsibilities have been
delegated to hybrids with little consideration of the potential political
costs. Thus critical questions have gone unanswered - even
unasked. 78
Since most hybrids are relatively young entities, there has been little critical analysis
of GSEs in the field of public administration. Even within the federal government, a
lack of introspection of exactly what constitutes GSEs and hybrid organizations has
further complicated matters. As Koppell notes, "Despite their popularity and
importance, hybrids have not received much attention. Improbable as it may seem,
no one knows just how many federal hybrids exist. This is a function of ambiguity,
not secrecy."
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As previously mentioned this "ambiguity" arises in large part due to a

lack of a federal statute in the U.S. Code that formally defines an instrumentality.
Even though this ambiguity of legal status may not bother individuals in government
who come from a business background, this ambiguity proves most troublesome for
academics in the field of public administration. Moe and Stanton ( 1989) argue that
this ambiguity represents a direct threat to accountability in government. They write,
"Ambiguity of legal status, however, is not a prerequisite for innovative management.
Quite the contrary, ambiguity of legal status is an invitation to mismanagement and
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the commingling of public and private interests, generally to the disadvantage of both
parties."

80

These words were echoed by Harold Seidman, who noted that

"'Intermingling of public and private purposes in a profit making corporation almost
inevitably means subordination of public responsibilities to corporate goals. We run
the danger of creating a system in which we privatize profits and socialize losses'
(Seidman 1998, 213)." 81
With the proliferation of hybrid organizations, GS Es have created another fold
in the complex operations of the federal government; an arena where "today's
administrators must function in a 'hollow state' with a core of public management
surrounded by an array of cross-institutional, primarily extra-governmental ties
(Milward and Provan 2000; O'Toole and Meier 1999; O'Toole 2000)." 82 These
"extra-governmental ties" can include the interests of national nonprofits, religious
organizations, and powerful lobbyists and other representatives from the private
sector. GSEs, while they can be more efficient in the provision of goods and services
than traditional modes of government, do not offer and cannot offer the same types of
accountability as traditional governmental agencies. The "traditional tools for
holding executive agencies accountable (such as the budge and general management
law)" usually do not apply to large, influential GSEs. 83 These issues of
accountability have usually not been applied to the discourse of GSEs most likely due
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to the popular sentiment that the government needs to be more efficient; therefore,
any changes that reduce red tape are welcome. Such a line of thought turns a blind
eye to administrative structure of GSEs and now this structure creates benefits for
these organizations that private enterprises do not enjoy. In addition, such a glib
approval of GSEs shows that many Americans do not understand the actual origins of
GSEs. While the average citizen has most likely heard of Fannie Mae or Freddie
Mac, the average citizen either assumes that they are private companies or purely
governmental agencies. The convoluted historical development of GSEs and their
lack of basis in public and administrative law do not encourage open discourse of
how these organizations lack accountability mechanisms that are present in most
traditional governmental agencies. The simple matter is that GSEs are a different
breed of animal-they are neither a purely private interest nor a governmental
agency. Their presence occupies an idiosyncratic place in the discourse of public
administration. While there are supporters and detractors of GSEs on either side of
the argument, most public administrators and lawmakers would agree that since
"GSEs have access to public funds through their ability to pledge the government's
implicit guarantee.to back virtually any obligation they decide to incur ... they must be
regulated or supervised if the federal government is to protect itself from potentially
unlimited financial exposure. " 84
Uitimately, GS Es play an invaluable role in the provision of governmental
services. In the past, some staunch critics of GSEs attempted to abolish these
84
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organizations from existence, arguing that "federally supported borrowing by
GS Es ... distorted the allocation of financial resources and discouraged borrowers
without access to federal subsidies."
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Obviously, such attempts of extinguishing

GSEs have been met with little support from Congress. GSEs such as Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac have come to the fore in their provision of goods and services, even
if the average citizen remains unaware of their administrative history or structure. In
the end, to ensure that GSEs do not usurp their public purposes for private sector
goals of profitability and/or its own institutional goals, the reality of the impact GS Es
can have on the nation requires that lawmakers and public administrators reassess
what the term accountability means and how that definition changes when it is
confronted with a GSE. Prior to this assessment, administrators and managers must
conduct some introspection and determine how their management paradigm colors
their view on efficiency, the rule of law, government, and accountability.

The Entrepreneurial Management Paradigm vs. the Constitutionalist
Management Paradigm
GSEs, by their form and function, represent a distinctive group of
organizations. These organizations, chartered by Congress and/or the President, are
operated by private individuals who seek a profit for their shareholders. While these
organizations were founded to address certain issues in the public realm, they
simultaneously espouse the capitalist mantra of finding new and more efficient ways
of obtaining a profit. As mentioned previously, GSEs continue to grow in their
85
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popularity because they are off-budget organizations that are flexible, cost-reducing,
efficient organizations-all these adjectives embody the antithesis of traditional
government programs. This intense focus on profitability, efficiency, output, results,
and cost-cutting have permanently shaped the vocabulary of the public administrator.
Paul Appleby made famous the succinct yet insightful phrase "Government is
different." For many years, this statement had held its ground; there existed one set of
theories and descriptors for the public/government sector, and there existed a distinct,
separate set of theories and vocabulary for the business sector. The proliferation of
GSEs has challenged this simple notion that government is, indeed, different after all.
Does_ the presence of GSEs invite government to become better suited at its assorted
functions? Do GSEs improve government? Is there really a difference between
government behavior and business behavior? How society answers these questions
will ultimately indicate how the federal government will evolve in the coming
decades.
Prior to the creation and growth of GSEs, many theorists would have agreed
with Appleby-government is distinctively different from the private sector of free
enterprise. Public administration theorists trace back this dichotomy in these two
sectors to the founding of this nation. As Moe (200 I) observes, the basis for this
distinction between the government and private sectors is founded in law. 86
According to this theoretical framework known as the constitutionalist management
paradigm, the government sector, which includes the various divisions of government
86
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regardless of horizontal and vertical divisions, is separate from the private sector
because it has its basis in the Constitution and public law. 87 Government is different
from business because
[The] distinguishing characteristic of governmental management,
contrasted with private management, is that government actions must
have their basis in public law, not in the financial interests of private
entrepreneurs or in the fiduciary concerns of corporate managers. The
hierarchical structure found in the executive branch is designed more
to ensure accountability for managerial actions; promoting control
over employees is secondary. 88
The constitutionalist management paradigm does not focus on "efficiency" or
"output," but instead it focuses on establishing accountable management through the
basis of constitutional and public law. This management paradigm is contrasted with
what Moe (1995) labels as the entrepreneurial management paradigm.
In contrast to the constitutional management paradigm, the entrepreneurial
management paradigm has the "underlying premise that the government and private
sectors are fundamentally alike and subject to most of the same economically derived
behavioral norms (Kettl 2000; Schneider, Teske, and Minstrom 1995; Stretton and
Orchard 1994). "
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The entrepreneurial management paradigm has existed in some

form since the latter half of the twentieth century but gained prominence during the
first term of President Clinton in the early 1990s. According to the National
Performance Review (NPR), which was a "reform initiative begun by the Clinton

administration, [it] proposed sweeping changes to laws governing personnel,
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procurement and budgeting within the executive branch of government (Gore
1993)." 90 Many of the changes proposed within the NPR derive their theoretical
basis from the entrepreneurial management paradigm. According to the
entrepreneurial management paradigm, "the principal, if not exclusive, objective is
results, and this principle should be applied to the governmental sector as well." 91
One can observe this focus on efficiency and program outputs in the major themes of
the NPR. Graham and Roberts (2004) write that this:
New paradigm ... contained three major themes. The first was a desire
to release public servants from a welter of rules that were thought to
make public organizations inflexible and inefficient. The second was
a renewed emphasis on the reporting of results achieved by public
organizations, and the use of this data to levy rewards or penalties. A
final theme was said to be a new pragmatism about the choice of
institutional structures used to deliver public services. 92
For the entrepreneurial management paradigm, government activities ought to
be conducted like a business. The objectives of the entrepreneurial management
paradigm as outlined by Moe and Gilmour ( 1995) summarize the main impetus
behind this business-management approach to governmental management. These
objectives include the casting aside of "red tape," ensuring customer satisfaction,
promoting the decentralization of authority, and providing governmental programs
that "work better and cost less" than traditional provision of goods and services. 93
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Moreover, within the NPR, former Vice-President Al Gore stated that "many of the
service delivery functions within the federal government would be reorganized as
'performance-based organizations,' or PBOs." Gore emphasized that regarding these
PBOs that" ... we're going to toss out the restrictive rules that keep them from doing
business like a business. All the red tape, personnel rules that keep managers from
using people effectively, the budget restrictions that make planning or allocating
resources almost impossible (NPR 1996c:7)." 94
The NPR report continues this emphasis on productivity and efficiency,
stating that '"effective entrepreneurial governments cast aside red tape, shifting from
systems in which people are accountable for following rules to systems in which they
are accountable for achieving results' (NPR 1996c:6-7)." 95
The entrepreneurial management paradigm represents a dynamic change in
the manner in which managers theorize how government functions and what
objectives it should be achieving. Even the parlance of the entrepreneurial
management paradigm differs significantly from the constitutionalist management
paradigm; for example, the entrepreneurial management paradigm focuses on
"customer satisfaction." Such a term would be extremely out of place in the
constitutionalist management paradigm, where the main focus is on accountability of
government programs based upon public law, not economic theory.
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While the entrepreneurial management paradigm represents a symbolic shift
in the way in which governments utilize hybrid organizations in the provision of
goods and services, its theoretical framework has come under fire for its lack of
accountability.

96

Moe and Gilmour (1995) stated this criticism bluntly, writing, "The

entrepreneurial management model is not and cannot be a substitute for political and
legal accountability."
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Moe (2001) continues this criticism of the entrepreneurial

management paradigm:
Under the entrepreneurial management paradigm, the vision is to
create a society of government/private partnerships based on
pragmatics application of performance-oriented objectives, or what
Harlan Cleveland (2000) approvingly refers to as the "nobody-incharge society" .... Those advocating entrepreneurial management tend
to favor organizational disaggregation and managerial autonomy.
Congress is viewed as a nuisance to be avoided, and central
management agencies are to be stripped of much of their authority and
capacity. 98
Furthermore, "for constitutionalists, the quasi-government tends to represent a retreat
from democratic values and accountable management." 99 For many of the critics of
the entrepreneurial management paradigm, the reliance on market measures to ensure
efficiency and "outputs" provides no measures of actual managerial accountability.
Economic theory does state that competition is good for the market because it
increases efficiency, output, and lowers costs. While economic theory is compatible
with the marketplace, it omits a key variable in its analysis of the entrepreneurial
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management paradigm: politicization. The entrepreneurial management paradigm's
conception of accountability is very similar to the accountability model in
government contracting:
Traditional market models of contracting assume that contractors will
be disciplined by market forces such as competition, ease of seller
access to the contract market, and ready and inexpensive availability
of relevant contract info and alternative providers. Accountability
under such conditions relies on the market to ensure desirable
behavior. A more common situation occurs under imperfect market
conditions, or Sclar' s incomplete contract scenario, characterized by
frequent transactions among contractual parties and high levels of
uncertainty about future situations covered by the contract and about
product and/or process. Accountability in this setting tends to generate
contracts that grow exponentially in detail, a "contract fattening"
process. 100
In reality, perfect market conditions almost never exist. For this example,
under imperfect conditions, government executives would not be able to dismantle
one hybrid organization in exchange for another. As a hybrid organization comes
into existence, it builds a constituency in addition to establishing its own institutional
goals, which may or may not conflict with the program goals of the entrepreneurial
management. Moreover, for the provision of many goods and services, the
government acts as monopolist in certain markets where the high costs prevent the
entry of competitors into that market. Although the entrepreneurial model boasts of
the flexibility of making the government more businesslike, the entrepreneurial model
seemingly ignores the presence of any interest groups involved with a given hybrid
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that may prevent the federal government from shuttering that particular hybrid and/or
implementing a new hybrid organization.
At the heart of this debate over which management paradigm government
ought to pursue, polarization of the issue has muted much insightful dialogue from
occurring between the proponents of each management paradigm. Supporters of the
constitutionalist management paradigm desire for to sever the government's love
affair with capitalist influences and return to its basis of constitutional and public law,
all in effort to reestablish a dearth of managerial and programmatic accountability.
On the contrary, proponents of the entrepreneurial management paradigm view a
reliance on administrative law as restricting hybrid organizations from fully achieving
their potential. In summary, many constitutionalists would wish to severely limit the
growth and scope of hybrid organizations such as GSEs, while entrepreneurs desire to
achieve accountability through market mechanisms. Gamble ( 1996) summarizes,
"The difference between economic liberals and liberal collectivists is that the former
believes that the best guarantee of that accountability is the protection of the
institutional order of the market, while the latter place their faith in the institutional
order of democratic government."
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(Gamble 130). At the core of these disputes

remains issue of accountability, but the mere identification of this core issue does
little to clarify the issue further. What is accountability? In short, the answer to this
question depends on exactly who is asked such a question.
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What is Accountability?
If a person were to survey 100 random people, the chances are the surveyor
would receive 100 different responses. The ironic fact of the matter is that in a time
when the general public demands more accountability, no one can clearly articulate
what it is exactly they mean when they demand more accountability. Concerned
citizens and watchdog groups clamor for "More accountable schools!" and "More
accountable government!" and "More accountable businesses!" Yet, few people stop
and ask what they really mean when they say they want more accountability. The
following section is an investigation into what various sectors of society consider to
be accountability and how these preconceived notions affect the manner in which the
public-at-large holds the government accountable for its actions. This action does not
represent a trite, meaningless exercise in semantics-the implications of how a group
conceives a word such as accountability has permanent effects on how government is
conducted.
A comprehensive analysis of accountability in American government and its
associated agencies has its logical beginning in the examination of American
federalism. The founders of the U.S. Constitution concurred that the most
appropriate form of government to be had in the United States, given its unique
resources, cultures, and history, was a federated form of government. In this type of
federal government, each branch of government, including the executive, legislative,
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and judicial branches, serve as a check and balance for the other branches of
government. This system of checks and balances represents a case of what some
would identify as internal accountability; i.e., each branch of the federal government
depends upon the cooperation of the other branches in order to function. Beryl Radin
summarizes this phenomenon in his text The Accountable Juggler:
The structure of American government, based on the concept of shared
powers between separate institutions, establishes the framework or
design for any approach to accountability. In that structure, every
actor or institution operates in a diffuse system where individuals and
institutions are forced to accommodate one another. This Madisonian
structure has been described as a "harmonious system of mutual
frustration." 102
In the federal system of government, the various branches must communicate,
interact, and bargain with one another in order to enact policy change. The
Constitution was especially designed to force such checking and bargaining. By no
means is the Constitution a document written for reasons of efficiency-a
government without these necessary checks leads itself towards tyranny, where
accountability becomes a mere artifact of the past.

Accountability is not Solely Controllability

In his text The Politics of Quasi Government, Jonathan Koppell writes, "Some
have argued that elected officials should always retain control over the unelected
bureaucracy; at least as many have argued that bureaucratic discretion is a
requirement for good governance. In much scholarship, however, this debate gets

rn, Beryl A. Radin, The Accountable Juggler: The Art ofLeadership in a Federal Agency (Washington,
D.C.: CQ Press), 12.
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papered over by the conflation of control and "'accountability."' 103 For many people,
when asked what accountability means to them, they may state that accountability is
having a manager or director having control over a given organization. To conflate
the term accountability to mean control not only does a disservice to other potentially
viable forms of accountability, such an action also ignores the presence of
accountability in the American federalist system of government. In the federal
government, the legislative branch cannot "control" the executive branch or vice
versa. Accountability in this sense is the bargaining and compromising in which the
three branches partake.
While accountability is not solely control, control can serve as a shade or
dimension of accountability. In this sense, accountability becomes like a diamond
with numerous facets. The task that remains is to identify these other facets or layers
of accountability and how they manifest themselves in the public sphere. Koppell
(2003) identifies several popular conceptions of accountability. These conceptions of
accountability are recreated in Table I below:
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Table 1: Conceptions of Accountability. 104
Conceution of Accountabilitv
Key Determination
Transparency
Did the organization reveal the facts of its
performance?
Liability
Did the organization face consequences
for its performance?
Controllability
Did the organization do what the
principal (e.g., Congress, the President)
desired?
Resoonsibilitv
Did the organization follow the rules?
Responsiveness
Did the organization fulfill the
substantive expectation (demand/need)?

While controllability is a conception of accountability according to Table I, it alone
does not tell the full story of accountability. Transparency, liability, controllability,
responsibility, and responsiveness all are dimensions of accountability. Broadly
speaking, accountability as conceptualized in Table I can be thought of as simply
answerability. In this sense, "[accountability} means answerability for one's actions
or behavior, often "to higher authorities including elected and appointed officials who
sit at the apex of institutional chains of command and to directly involved
stakeholders, for performance that involves delegation of authority to act" (Kearns,
1996, p. 11). 105 Nevertheless, thinking of accountability simply as answerability
does little to quell the debate over how the government should hold itself accountable
for its actions.
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Conceiving accountability as answerability adds new dimensions to this
analysis, but it alone does not suffice as an all-encompassing definition. Dicke and
Ott (1999) cite that accountability as answerability includes five "often-competing
structural dimensions ... that incorporate accountability for resources, performance,
and outcomes of services." 106 Table 2 below shows a summary of these five
dimensions of accountability:
Table 2: Dimensions of Accountabilitv. 107
Dimensions of Accountabilitv
Central Themes
Hierarchical
Hierarchical relationships, close
supervision. Compliance with clearly
stated directives.
Legal
Tasks carried out in accordance with
constitutional principles, Jaws or
contractual obligations. Binding
sanctions are available.
Professional
Discretion is exercised by those with
expertise. Individual experts are
answerable for their decisions and
actions.
Political
Demand for responsiveness. Satisfaction
of key stakeholders; clientele-centered
management.
Moral and Ethical
Standards of good behavior arise from
conscience, organizational norms,
standards, and concern for the general
welfare.

Dicke and Ott's (1999) analysis of accountability in the public sector extends the
definition of accountability beyond simple control by a manager. When applied to
the provision of public goods and services, accountability becomes more than simply
106
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control; accountability becomes a " ... moral, professional, and ethical construct that
results when public officials and contractors serve with a commitment to do the right
things."

108

While this analysis by Koppell (2003) and Dicke and Ott (1999)

illuminate the numerous layers of meaning of the term "accountability," the question
remains: how does government ensure accountability in its actions?
Perhaps a more appropriate question to ask is: How does the government
ensure accountability in the provision of goods and services considering their reliance
on hybrid organizations such as GSEs? As most scholars and critics agree, the
government's reliance on hybrids in the provision of services has resulted in a loss of
control. Koppell (2003) writes, "The core conclusion ... is that reliance on hybrid
organizations does result in a loss of control. ... However, it is not a conclusion that
renders that idea of quasi-government inimical to democracy." 109 Controllability
lacks force as an accountability measure in reference to hybrids. Congress has a
difficult time in regulating hybrids because the "(!) difficulty in measuring both costs
and benefits of hybrid programs; (2) hybrids' off-budget status; (3) Congress'
reliance on regulatory agents; (4) conflict among hybrids' objectives; and (5) the
political influence ofhybrid organizations." 110 Some of the reasons of why the
government instituted hybrids in the first place are a double-edged sword-these
same reasons are the reasons why accountability as controllability does not hold for
these GSEs. Controllability does not apply well for instrumentalities where there
108
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exists an unclear line of accountability. For controllability to be a useful dimension
of accountability, "Ideally, lines of accountability should be direct and
unambiguous." 111
These direct and unambiguous lines of accountability can be found primarily
in executive level agencies. Regarding these agencies, the government can exert high
degrees of controllability by utilizing administrative and regulatory control tools such
as legislation, the budget process, appointment and confirmation, executive orders,
oversight, federal management laws, monitoring, sanctions and remedies, and
litigation and mediation. 112 The traditional view of accountability as controllability
relies on several methods to ensure accountability. One of the most popular methods
used by officials to ensure accountability in government is auditing, which is "a
systematic control-oriented process assessment to evaluate the match or discrepancy
between an established standard and the existing condition." 113 A shortcoming of
audit-based verifications is that audits are retrospective and depend upon an
established framework for their proper analysis. Audits provide little guidance in
making proactive managerial decisions when confronted with an alien policy
environment. Monitoring is a secondary measuring for ensuring accountability. In
contrast to audits, "monitoring is ongoing oversight conducted during the
performance ofa contract." 114
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On the contrary, the proliferation of hybrid organizations within the
government has forever changed the ways in which government officials achieve and
verify accountability. This change could represent a paradigm shift from
accountability as controllability to other dimensions of accountability:
Far too much attention has been paid to traditional or compliance
accountability and process accountability, and far too little
to ... managerial accountability (which focuses on the judicious use of
public resources), program accountability (which is concerned with the
outcomes or results of government operations), and social
accountability (which attempts to determine the social impacts of
governmental programs) .... But overdependence on controls means
that other e~ually significant dimensions of accountability may be
neglected. 11
Moreover, relying on accounting measures to ensure accountability has its limits,
whether they are used to verify accountability for traditional governmental agencies
or for recent GS Es. Miller ( 1996) extrapolates on these limitations of accounting
standards when he writes, "If accountants are to continue to play an ever-increasing
role in managing the new public sectors, it is important to identify the limits of their
expertise."

116

He continues his critique by quoting Johnson and Kaplan in their book

Relevance Lost, who write, "Today's management accounting information[ ... ] is too
late, too aggregated, and too distorted to be relevant for managers' planning and
control decisions." 117 Accountants, like any professional, are confined to the
theoretical framework of their particular field. Professional and interest groups such
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as the AICPA define industry best-practices and establish uniform standards for
certified public accountants. On the other hand, uncertainty exists even in the field of
accounting. Judgments are based off the previous year's data, whose data was based
upon the year prior to that. Miller concludes, "For if accountants continue to have
difficulty in measuring precisely product costs, or in valuing accurately particular
types of investment in the private sector, it is likely that such issues will prove even
more difficult to resolve in the world of the public sector where goals are more
ambiguous and multiple constituencies have to be served ... " 118
Ultimately, the new demands for accountability measures that GSEs bring
with their proliferation require a thorough reevaluation of what officials have
traditionally considered to be measures of accountability. While some critics believe
that "a good part of the quasi-governments appeal, and of its growth" is its lack of
accountability, supporters of GSEs and other hybrids contend that such critics are
attempting to apply twentieth-century accountability techniques to address twentyfirst century problems.

119

Specifically, for GSEs, one must take into account their

influence over constituencies when attempting to enact accountability measures. As
Koppell (2003) notes, "Structures led by a single individual are more likely to take
decisive action and challenge an influential hybrid organization than a regulatory
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agency led by a multi-member commission." 12 Congress adopted this plan to reign
in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac when it abolished the OFHEO and put into place a
118
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Director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA). With the growth ofGSEs,
public administrators and other officials must realize that controllability alone cannot
guarantee proper accountability for these new hybrids. Accountability in these
circumstances is truly a juggling process, where it "moves far beyond formal
processes associated with control. ... Thus accountability in the federal government in
the twenty-first century requires public sector leaders who are able to juggle multiple
pressure, actors, and processes." 121 To hold GSEs accountable, administrators must
recognize the multiple facets and dimensions of accountability. These administrators
must be willing to consider that controllability alone does not equate to
accountability. While controllability is a valid form of accountability, administrators
must recognize the transparency, liability, hierarchical, legal, professional, political,
and moral and ethical aspects of accountability. Miller intimates towards this
reevaluation of accountability when he states, "Instead of asking how we might
calculate the performance bonus to be awarded to a manager, we should ask what
type of an organization is desired, what type of goals are to be fostered." 122 In
summary, effective accountability and management of GS Es is "more than simple
control; it is also capacity building." 123
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A "Clash of Cultures"

Much of the current debate over GSEs can be boiled down to issues of
democracy, accountability, popular sovereignty, and public management. The
general opinion of the ardent critics of GSEs is that their presence within the
government of the US represents a direct and immediate threat to all of these themes.
One of the strongest criticisms ofGSEs is that these organizations lack any basis in
public law as to their origin. While numerous acts of Congress and the executive
have chartered individual GSEs and other hybrids to address specific issues, no law
has been written in the U.S. Code that addresses these instrumentalities in general.
The glaring omission of GSEs and other instrumentalities in public law represents a
potential threat to the safeguards put in place by public law; Moe and Gilmour (1995)
address the importance of public law when they write, "Public law is the underappreciated 'cement' that binds the separated powers of the administrative state,
ensures political and legal accountability of its officials, and restrains abuses of
administrative discretions and conflicts ofinterest." 124 On the contrary, many of the
supporters of GSEs view these instrumentalities in the lenses of the entrepreneurial
management paradigm. For these proponents of GS Es, these instrumentalities are
now an integral piece of government. They provide alternatives to the tired,
inefficient agency system of the federal government and usher in efficient use of
resources and increased "outputs." 125 GSEs reduce red tape and make government
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work "better." These organizations are flexible and can easily adjust to dynamic
environments. For these individuals of the entrepreneurial management paradigm,
public law is not an essential component in order for these GSEs to accomplish their
task.
As scholars have indicated, what has occurred is a "fundamental clash of
cultures ... between the legal and business cultures for acceptance of their principles
by the government management community." 126 Represented by the constitutional
management paradigm and the entrepreneurial management paradigm, these two
"cultures" are at odds with one another. Simply put, the private sector and public
sector have their origins in "fundamentally different streams of legal doctrine: one
traditionally rooted in judge-made common law, protecting rights and asserting duties
in the relations of private individuals; the other founded on the body of the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights and articulated by a truly enormous body of
statutory, regulatory, and case law .... " 127 In effect, what has occurred at the federal
government with the proliferation of GSEs has been in effect a zero-sum game; i.e.,
the rise of the influence of the private sector into governmental management has
resulted in a proportional disregard for the constitutional origins of public
administration. In the eyes of many, the field of public administration "has largely
abandoned or forgotten its roots in public law-in the Constitution, statutes, and case
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law-and has accepted, to varying degrees, the generic behavioral principles of
management as taught in schools ofbusiness." 128
Moreover, the two competing paradigms treat the presence of each paradigm
in government management as almost mutually exclusive. To the entrepreneurial
management paradigm, inefficiencies are unnecessary and should be done away in an
effort to streamline government functions and increase output. Alternatively, for the
constitutionalist management paradigm, some inefficiencies are a necessary
component of public management. As Madison wrote, such inefficiencies can serve
as a safeguard from the "accumulations of all power, legislative, executive, and
judiciary in the same hands" that could lead to "the very definition oftyranny." 129
With the continuous proliferation of GSEs at the federal level, many critics
fear that the President has slowly relinquished his duties as chief executive or "chief
manager." The rise of the entrepreneurial management paradigm has created a
"system of management by exceptions, a system where agencies, interest groups, and
Congressional committees can join together at the expense of the President and the
collective interests of the executive branch." 130 Up until the 1950s, the President had
acted "chief manager" for the administrative system. Through the late 1960s into the
· 1970s, the President gradually lost this role as the federal government began to rely
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more on the private sector and instrumentalities like GSEs. 131 In addition, the Office
of Management and Budget (0MB) has displaced management priorities for budget
priorities, and it has done this for quite some time. 132 The gradual eroding of the
emphasis on constitutional law and the managerial capacity of the President and
0MB has created a federal government that has forgotten its origins.
Why does this all matter? Why should concerned citizens be hesitant to
embrace a management paradigm that has no basis in constitutional law? For many
scholars and, supporters of the entrepreneurial management paradigm, what has been
occurring over the last thirty years at the federal level simply appears to be a natural
evolution of government. With the increasing demands placed on the federal
government by the public, the government had to find alternative methods to
addressing these social issues. Many of these issues were the "political
consequences" of a "free unfettered market economy." While traditional
governmental agencies provided some relief to these issues, the federal government
began to tum to market economy itself as a solution to amend the negative
externalities created by the market itself. 133 Citizens should be concerned about the
increasing presence of the private sector and GSEs in the federal government because
history has shown that privatization is not democracy. Benjamin Barber (1996)
writes:
131
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The disastrous consequences that follow from patterning political
reforms on macro-economic theory are patently visible in countries
from Russia to Latin America and Africa, where according to
Guillermo O'Donnell, a leading Latin American political scientist, "as
the private sphere flourishes ... the public sphere crumbles." To him,
the matter is simple: privatization is not democratization. Period. 134
The infusing of private sector thinking into the level of the federal government that
goes unchecked creates the glaring absence of accountability. Without a basis in law,
instrumentalities such as GSEs only answer to rule of economists. This danger of an
unchecked deference to pragmatism and dealing with issues on an "ad hoc basis"
makes it extremely difficult for government administrators, including Congress and
the President, "to impose accountability, especially if opposed by parties interested in
lax oversight." 135

Conclusion
The U.S. government has undoubtedly reached a defining moment in its
administrative history. The increasing reliance on GS Es such as Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac has forever changed the ways in which the federal government ensures
the provision of certain public goods and services. These instrumentalities and others
like them have become an integral part of the federal government and its daily
operations. While instrumentalities have been lauded by some members of Congress
for their flexibility and responsiveness in addressing critical social issues, these very
organizations can pose a threat to the legal foundations of this nation. Critics are
134
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correct in stating that ambiguous accountability resulting from the proliferation of
GSEs is a threat to the U.S. system of federalism, governmental accountability,
popular sovereignty, and democracy. Supporters of the constitutionalist management
and entrepreneurial management paradigms are equally vocal in their raucous
condemnation of the opposing paradigm. Strong supporters of the constitutionalist
management paradigm desire to sever ties completely with GSEs, hybrids, or any
instrumentalities that lack basis in public law. In contrast, supporters of the
entrepreneurial management paradigm feel that not enough is being done at the
government level to promote instrumentalities as effective means of achieving
program outputs. For these individuals, the capitalist market is the solution to the
problems of a bloated federal budget and ineffective government agencies.
The simple fact of the matter is that GS Es and other instrumentalities have
become too entrenched in the everyday operations of the federal government for them
to be completely removed and carved out of the government's psyche. GSEs like
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have created powerful interest groups that (legally)
lobby Congress in an effort to influence certain legislation. This fact does not mean
that reform is impossible and governmental reform is a lost cause:
Not long ago, Peter Drucker wrote that "Any organization, whether
biological or social. .. needs to rethink itself once it is more than forty
or fifty years old. It has outgrown its policies and its rules of behavior.
If it continues in its old ways, it becomes ungovernable,
unmanageable, uncontrollable." 136
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If left unchecked, GSEs and other instrumentalities could reach a point where these
organizations do become ungovernable, unmanageable, and uncontrollable. Even
though many critics have called for the reform of GSEs, little has been suggested in
the way of actual reform. The overly-technical functions of GSEs and their lack of
media attention do not warrant the same type of fervent calls for reform that other
governmental programs receive from the public. Nevertheless, the accountability of
government depends on several necessary steps that must be taken to reform and
regulate GSEs and other instrumentalities.
First and foremost, laws must be incorporated in the body of the U.S. Code
that specifically addresses instrumentalities, their forms, and their functions in the
federal government. "[A] generic law providing for comprehensive regulations of
GSEs and clarifying their status as instrumentalities rather than agencies of the United
States" would resemble legislation similar to Title 5 of the U.S. Code that concerns
agencies.

137

By codifying instrumentalities into public law, government managers,

Congress, the President, the judiciary, and the citizens would have a written
document explaining what instrumentalities are and explaining their intended
functions. A legal document would formally define the limitations, expectations,
appropriate administrative structures, and other specificities of GSEs that are
currently lacking in the U.S. Code.
The Housing and Economic Recovery Act of2008 signals a shift in the
appropriate direction for regulation ofGSEs and other hybrids by Congress. For the
137
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first time, a legal document drafted by Congress sets forth specific restrictions and
rules on the operations of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. On the contrary, such
specific legislation cannot regulate all GSEs. Even though the Housing and
Economic Recovery Act of 2008 brought considerable attention to the impact that
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have on the nation, the legislation was not designed to
become an expansive regulatory law for all GSEs and government instrumentalities.
As indicated by others critics, generic laws dictating the boundaries of GSEs will not
only protect the federal government, but these laws will also safeguard the private
sector and the citizens.
Regarding GSE reforms, government managers must look beyond
controllability as accountability as the only measure to ensure program compliance
for GSEs and other instrumentalities. Although direct control management represents
a valid form of accountability in the government setting, the face of the federal
government has changed substantially since the beginning of the twentieth century.
Gone are the days ofTaylorism and scientific management, where line managers
possessed direct control over outputs in a given bureaucracy. Today, the policy
environment for governmental organizations constitutes more than just the
governmental entity and the citizenry. Now, government administrators must face
numerous policy actors, such as interest groups, nonprofit organizations, the private
sector, and international governments, and confront numerous policy issues.
Moreover, to become an effective manager, an administrator must acknowledge the
multiple policy streams in the environment and devise a plan to find certain
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"windows of opportunity," to use the words of Kingdon. By recognizing the policy
interests of the public sector and the private sector, effective managers can hopefully
construct a policy that addresses the needs of each sector to some degree.
While reconciling multiple policy streams is an arduous yet rewarding task,
government administrators must be cognizant of the demands of the other types of
accountability-the hierarchical, legal, professional, political, moral and ethical
attributes of program accountability. This last attribute, moral and ethical
accountability, has the greatest impact on how various organizations contribute to
their own capacity building. When organizations are mindful of the demands of
moral and ethical accountability, these organizations construct an organization that
recognizes the multiple commitments it has to itself and the people it serves.
Capacity building occurs when administrators define the characteristics that their
organization will represent. Capacity building is simply creating the organization one
desires to create. Effective management seeks to go beyond controllability as
accountability and create an ethos of moral and ethical accountability within their
organization. Government administrators ought to recognize the multiple facets of
accountability and realize their ethical responsibility to society in general. In regards
to capacity building, Moe and Stanton (1989) write:
Management is more than simple control; it is also capacity building.
Management law, interpreted and administered with care, should
permit the agency or instrumentality to perform its public
responsibilities more effectively, not just more economically. Generic
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laws, properly written, provide a means to implement a comprehensive
managerial strategy. 138
Ultimately, the federal government of the U.S. must actively pursue measures
to regulate the function and reach of GSEs and instrumentalities. Without a doubt,
these organizations play a crucial role in providing for numerous public goods and
services that may otherwise not have been provided. In contrast, Congress and the
President must not be too quick to embrace the creeping of the private sector into the
public sector. The private and public sectors have their legal origins in two divergent
bodies oflaw, and each sector has its own theory of behavior. Accountability suffers
when government administrators fail to recognize this distinction. Unrestrained
privatization of governmental functions represents a threat to federalism and popular
sovereignty. On the contrary, administrators cannot dismiss the potential benefits of
incorporating private sector thinking into solving public sector problems. In the end,
one of the keys to this dilemma is to recognize the limitations of each sector and its
theory:
Renewing democracy in this perspective is about recognizing the
limits to democracy but also the limits to markets, and no longer
supposing that political virtue consists in a triumph of the one over the
other .... Decentralized markets joined with associative democracy
offer mechanisms of exit and voice which are both egalitarian and
libertarian. The renewal of democracy requires a release of social
energy and social imagination, a synergy which new forms of
governance and new kinds of markets might provide. 139
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This "synergy" of the private and public sectors can potentially yield great outcomes
for the federal government. Nevertheless, the tenets of federalism that have provided
checks and balances for over two hundred years, along with active public
administrators, must provide the appropriate oversight of this synthesis. The U.S.
simply cannot afford to sacrifice accountability for efficiency.
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